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WETLANDS PROTECTION UNDER THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS' NEW DREDGE AND
FILL JURISDICTION
The owner of a vacation home on a high mountain lake decides to
build a boat dock at the water's edge, but is vexed to discover that such
construction cannot be legally undertaken without federal agency per-
mission. A California rancher who dikes off and drains the marshy
margins of a stream is likewise amazed when he receives a cease and
desist order from the same agency. The unlikely regulator in these
instances is none other than the Army Corps of Engineers, the civilian
branch of the Defense Department traditionally committed to the con-
struction of federal public works projects.
This seemingly extreme extension of federal authority is the result
of a recent federal district court decision, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway,' which has compelled the Army Corps of
Engineers to assume a vastly greater role as an environmental protector
of America's waters and wetlands. The court's ruling involved the
corps' responsibility to regulate the disposal of dredge and fill2 material
under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) amendments of 1972.1 That act charged the corps with
primary regulatory responsibility for dredge and fill operations in "the
waters of the United States." The corps initially interpreted section 404
authority narrowly, confining itself to its traditional jurisdiction over
"navigable waters." Pursuant to the Callaway decision, the corps has
1. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
2. Dredging is the removal of sediment from aquatic areas, usually to create or
preserve navigable channels. The "dredge spoil" is either scraped out with a bucket and
crane (the "clamshell dredge") or sucked up by a hydraulic dredge, drawing sediment
and water through a suction pipe and pumping them to the disposal site. Disposal of
the dredged sediment has always presented a problem. One solution is to discharge the
dredged material at specified ocean or land disposal sites after obtaining a corps permit.
More often, the sediment is dumped on adjoining marshland, smothering the delicate
aquatic ecosystem, to build and maintain earthen dikes and to fill in the area behind
such dikes. Sediment thus disposed of is "fill," and is therefore subject to corps regula-
tion under section 404. Although fill material is often dredged sediment, the term is
defined by the corps regulation as any material used to fill in an aquatic area to create
dry land or to raise the bottom elevation of a water body. Thus rock, sand, dirt, gravel,
and concrete are among the other substances which comprise "fill." See 40 Fed. Reg.
31325 (1975).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV, 1974).
[223J
recently promulgated new interim 4 final regulations expanding its juris-
diction to "all the waters of the United States."
Although the corps has been regulating the nation's navigable
waters since before the turn of the century, it is a relative newcomer to
the field of environmental protection. A mission oriented agency nor-
mally concerned with such environmentally suspect projects as dam
building and flood control,' the corps has in recent years been forced to
acknowledge environmental concerns in its regulation of activities in the
nation's navigable waters. In order to evaluate the corps' new authority,
this note will (1) review the corps' traditional authority under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, (2) discuss the disputed origin of the
corps' expanded jurisdiction under the FWPCA amendments of 1972,
and (3) highlight the present corps jurisdiction under the new interim
final regulations, with an emphasis on potential problem areas.
Historical Background
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 18996 charged the Corps of
Engineers with the protection and regulation of the nation's "navigable
waters." Empowered by the commerce clause to regulate navigation,'
Congress sought to control the placement of obstructions (such as dikes,
bridges, and dams) in navigable waterways which might interfere with
waterborne commerce.
The most important provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act are
section 10s and section 13. 9 Section 10 consists of three proscriptive
clauses. The first clause prohibits "the creation of any obstruction not
affirmatively authorized by Congress." The second clause requires that
any structures built outside harbor lines be authorized by the corps. The
third and final clause makes it unlawful to alter or modify in any
4. The term "interim" indicates that the rules are subject to comment and revi-
sion.
5. As recently as 1969, the corps was labeled "public enemy number one" of the
environment by Justice William 0. Douglas. SATURDAY REV., May 1, 1971, at 4. See
also PLAYBOY, July 1969, at 143.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-09 (1970).
7. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
9. Id. § 407. Section 9, though less often invoked by either the corps or environ-
mentalists, is also worthy of note. This section makes it unlawful to construct any
bridge, dike, dam or causeway in a navigable water without both the consent of Congress
and approval of the corps. The value of section 9 as an environmental weapon appears
to be only recently recognized. In 1975, a federal district court held that section 9 au-
thorization was necessary for the construction of the California peripheral canal across
Middle River. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975). An even
more recent suit unsuccessfully sought the removal of unauthorized dikes constructed in
the San Francisco Bay marsh for salt production. Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., Civil
No. C-72-561 WTS (N.D. Cal., Mar. 11, 1976). These marshland areas are "navigable
in law," or subject to tidal action but for the unauthorized dikes.
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manner the condition, location or capacity of any navigable water
"unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same."'01
These requirements under section 10 have, theoretically at least, re-
quired corps authority for all dredging or filling operations within the
corps' navigable waters jurisdiction.
Section 13, better known as the Refuse Act, was the most impor-
tant provision for the abatement of water pollution prior to the FWPCA
amendments of 1972. The Refuse Act makes it illegal to discharge
refuse into navigable waters, or to deposit such refuse in places where it
might be easily washed into such waters. To these prohibitions there
are two exceptions. First, the Refuse Act does not apply to sewage
flowing from streets and sewers in a liquid state.:" Second, refuse may
be legally placed in navigable waters with the authorization of the Corps
of Engineers. Despite the second exception, no administrative process
for issuing refuse permits was established until 1971.12 Although
section 13 was not repealed by the FWPCA amendments and is still in
effect, all permit authority under this section has been superseded by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under sections 402 and 405
of the 1972 amendments.' 3 Because of this, prosecutions under the
Refuse Act are rare today.14
The Rivers and Harbors Act was initially concerned only with
activities affecting navigability in waters actually or potentially used for
maritime commerce.' 5 This confined jurisdictional scope has been
broadened gradually by United States Supreme Court rulings. The
resulting augmentation of the corps' Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction
has been twofold, enlarging both the geographical jurisdiction and the
subject matter jurisdiction of the agency.
The classic geographical definition of "navigable waters" was first
expressed in The Daniel Ball" as waters that
10. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
11. The Supreme Court has applied a strict and narrow interpretation to this ex-
ception. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
12. The section 13 permit program was finally established by Exec. Order No.
11,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).
13. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31323 (1975).
14. Although the discharge permit authority has been shifted to the Environmental
Protection Agency and incorporated into the enforcement provisions of the FWPCA,
section 13 continues to be an important tool for cases which cannot be covered under
the 1972 act. Such cases include short-term discharges, such as oil spills, non-"point-
source" discharges, and solid waste deposits into navigable waters. See Ipsen & Raisch,
Enforcement Under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND
&WATER L Rnv. 369, 412 (1974).
15. See 32 CONG. Ruc. 2297 (1899). See also J. DAVms, Tim PoLmcs OF POLLU-
T1ON 38 (1970).
16. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
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form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with
other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may
be carried on with other states or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. 17
This simple definition proved inadequate, however, and the territorial
scope of the term has been successively broadened by judicial decisions.
Thus the scope of the "navigable servitude" has since been extended to
include all waters capable of commercial use,18 all waters with a past
history of commercial use,19 and even waterways which could become
navigable "with reasonable improvements."20
Just as the Supreme Court has broadened the geographical defini-
tion of "navigable waters," it has also widened the regulatory concern
(or subject matter jurisdiction) of the corps. In United States v.
Appalachian Electric Co.,2 the Court held that federal power over
navigable water is not limited to control for navigation, but that the
power over navigable waters is as broad as the needs of commerce. The
Court mentioned flood protection, watershed development, and hydroe-
lectric power as other concerns touching navigable waters that are
within the scope of the commerce power. 22 In United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co.,2 3 the Court rejected the view that the Refuse Act applied
only to substances that hindered navigation. "Refuse" was held to
include all foreign substances and pollutants, because the statute was
intended to remedy injuries "caused in part by obstacles that impeded
navigation and in part by pollution. 2 4  Thus, pollution also became a
legitimate concern under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Finally, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Zabel v.
Tabb,28 held that protection of the marine environment is a legitimate
concern of the commerce power, and that corps permits could be denied
for activities adversely affecting the environment whether or not naviga-
tion was affected. The Fifth Circuit cited the Fish and Wildlife Coordi-
nation Act 26 and the National Environmental Policy Act27 in holding
that the corps is mandated to consider environmental effects before
issuing a permit.2 8
17. Id. at 563.
18. See The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
19. See Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
20. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 426.
23. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
24. Id. at 228-29.
25. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66(c) (1970).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
28. "The Secretary must weigh the effect a dredge and fill project will have on
conservation before he issues a permit lifting the Congressional ban." 430 F.2d at 211.
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Clearly, the corps' traditional authority over navigable waters,
despite its maritime emphasis, included a nascent environmental role. As
the corps' jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act increased, both
geographically and in subject matter, its duty to protect the marine
environment did likewise. The new section 404 authority over dredge
and fill projects in no way replaces this earlier corps duty, but should
instead be seen as extending it to vast new areas of the nation's waters
and wetlands.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972
The Statute
The FWPCA amendments of 197229 were enacted by Congress to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters."30  The act, which entirely replaced the Water
Quality Act,31 established a national goal of "swimmable" water by 1983
and the elimination of pollutant discharges into waters by 1985.2 The
primary administrator of the act is the EPA, which is responsible for
regulating the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United
States.33
Section 301(a)34 makes the discharge of any pollutant from a
"point source"35 unlawful unless a permit is obtained. The permit
process revolves around the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System, primarily established by section 402 of the act. Under section
402, the administrator of the EPA can issue permits allowing the
discharge of pollutants subject to the effluent limitations set by the
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
30. Id. § 1251(a).
31. The FWPCA amendments of 1972 incorporated many features of the weaker
Water Quality Act of 1965. The 1965 act relied on the states to develop water quality
standards and implementation plans. The implementation plans were often very general
and ineffective, with no real technical analysis of the degree of pollution treatment nec-
essary to achieve the proclaimed standards. The act's "non-degradation policy," added
to prevent pollution of cleaner waters, was in practice waivable by the states if they
found such waiver economically or socially justifiable. A critical omission in the 1965
act was the lack of technology-based effluent limitations, a problem cured by the 1972
act. See Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDEMA ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW 682 (1974).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
33. See Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,
77 Dict. L. REv. 459, 468-75 (1973).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
35. A "point source" is defined in the act as any "discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance" from which pollutants are discharged. This includes pipes, ditches,
channels, vessels, and any other locatable source of pollution. Id. § 1362(14).
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EPA.30 The discharge elimination system permit program is delegable
to the states, and any state with a water pollution control agency
approved by the EPA becomes qualified to administer its own discharge
permit program.3 7 States are free to promulgate standards more strin-
gent than those required by the EPA, 8s but the EPA can disapprove
weaker water quality standards as inconsistent with the act.3 9 Even
after delegation of the permit authority to an approved state agency, the
EPA retains the authority to veto permit approvals on a case-by-case
basis.4 °
A "pollutant" for the purposes of the act is defined to include,
among other items, "dredge spoil" 41 -the sludge material removed from
water areas by dredging. The inclusion of dredge spoil among the
defined list of pollutants reflects a justifiable concern with the damage to
water quality and wetlands caused by the siltation attendant to dredging
operations. An example of this kind of environmental damage was
present in United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.,42 where the defend-
ant was filling a marsh to create a trailer park:
The immediate result of the development in this area was the
complete removal and destruction of all living mangrove plants.
With the loss of mangroves, which are indigenous to the shores of
the Florida Keys, went all wading and shore birds previously found
in this area. The excavation of the access channels and canals by
the defendants removed the peat natural to the bottom and ex-
posed the underlining sand or rock.
[D]efendants' extensive dredging of canals done without pro-
tective measures being taken, releases large amounts of silt, which
is composed of crushed rock and sand. This silt is spread about
the bay by tide, wave action and wind and as it is dispersed, settles
back upon the bay bottom. This creates a situation where once
the sand and rock was covered by the peat bottom, the silt covers
the peat. In effect, this acts to suffocate the peat and other living
vegetable forms. Further, as all plants require sunlight to carry
out the process of photosynthesis, the clouding of the water by silt
through the dredging operations blocks off sunlight, which impedes
and injures the growth of plant life in the bay. The destruction
of peat, besides the effects already mentioned, also results in the
36. Id. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
37. California has an approved program administered by the Regional Water
Quality Control Board and the State Water Resources Control Board. See CAL. WATER
CoDE §§ 13000-13908 (West 1970).
38. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV, 1974).
39. Id. § 1313(c) (3).
40. Id. § 1342(d)(2).
41. Id. § 1362(6).
42. 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971), vacated in part on other grounds, 478
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
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killing of sea grasses, another form of vegetation in this area which
serves to protect and nourish forms of animal life.43
Even more important than the damage caused by siltation is the damage
to water quality caused by the dredging and disposal of polluted dredge
spoil. Many of our national waterways have become the repositories of
industrial wastes, and these wastes are a significant component of the
sediment beneath many rivers and harbors. The dredging and disposal
of these toxic sediments, with its unavoidable turbulence and siltation,
stirs them once more into the marine environment, causing substantial
water quality degradation. The legislative history of the FWPCA indi-
cates, however, that Congress primarily intended to regulate the dredg-
ing and disposal of polluted dredge spoil;" there is no mention of
landfill regulation or wetlands protection. Although Congress may
have overlooked the legislation's implications for wetlands protection,
the courts have inferred an intent to regulate landfill from the literal
wording of the section.45
The original Senate bill drew no distinction between dredge spoils
and other pollutants. However, section 404, inserted by amendment,
made the distinction and awarded jurisdiction over dredge spoils to the
secretary of the army who, acting through the chief of engineers, was to
issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into American
waters at specified disposal sites.4 The reason for delegating regulation
of dredge spoil to the corps is apparent; the corps already performed
this duty within its traditional "navigable waters" jurisdiction under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. To have given the EPA the task of
approving permits for dredge and fill operations in the area covered by
the FWPCA would have largely duplicated the permit system already in
existence.4 7 Under the House amendment, now section 404, the corps
permit program was merely extended, with the EPA and the corps
together formulating guidelines for the discharge of dredge spoil.48 As
an environmental safeguard, section 404 permits were left subject to
EPA scrutiny and veto where it determined that corps approved dredg-
ing discharges will nonetheless have unacceptable environmental ef-
fects. 49
43. Id. at 156-57.
44. See notes 47 & 67 infra.
45. See notes 67-68 infra.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV, 1974).
47. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ENVIRONWMNTAL POLICY DMSION,
92d CONG., Ist SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 177 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
49. Id. § 1344(c). There was understandable Congressional doubt about the
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A regrettable feature of the act is its continued use of the phrase
"navigable waters," the complex legal term of art normally used to
designate corps jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act. The act
defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 50  The ambiguity of the phrase and its unorthodox
definition have proven a fertile source of conflict over the intended
scope of the act.
The Dispute Over Section 404 Jurisdiction
In response to the 1972 act, the corps proposed regulations in 1973
expanding its jurisdiction under section 404 to include "waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.""' When the final revised
regulations were issued in the spring of 1974, however, the corps chose
to define its new section 404 power in terms of the corps' traditional
jurisdiction over "navigable waters."52  The regulation thus failed to
acknowledge any expansion of corps jurisdiction beyond that exercised
under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
This brought the corps into direct conflict with the policy followed
by the EPA, which was asserting jurisdiction under the act "to the
broadest extent possible subject to the Constitutional limits of Congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause."5  The EPA believed the
new corps definition of "navigable waters" would substantially restrict
its jurisdiction under the act, and it felt that the corps was avoiding its
new jurisdictional authority out of concern for the quantum leap in its
new regulatory burden.54 It protested the corps' definition in a letter to
the chief engineer, which stated in part:
Our interpretation of "navigable waters" within the meaning of the
FWPCA does not conform to the Corps' recently issued regulation.
We firmly believe that the Conference Committee deleted "navi-
gable" from the FWPCA definition of navigable waters in order
to free pollution control from the jurisdictional restrictions based
on navigability. 55
The EPA letter referred to the legislative history of the act and cited the
recent court ruling in United States v. Holland56 to support its position.
corps' sensitivity to environmental values. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 47, at
1389.
50. Id. § 1362(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
51. 38 Fed. Reg. 12217 (1973).
52. 39 Fed. Reg. 12115 (1974).
53. Memorandum of Jeffrey H. Howard, Office of Enforcement and General
Counsel, EPA, to G. William Frick, Associate General Counsel, June 5, 1974.
54. Id.
55. Letter from John Quarles to Lt. General Gribble, Chief of Engineers, June 19,
1974.
56. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). Holland was the first of several cases
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The corps, however, preferred an entirely different interpretation
of the legislative history of the act, insisting (1) that Congress had
intended to confine the corps to its traditional role of guardian of
navigable waters, (2) that extension of the corps' permit jurisdiction
beyond traditional "navigable waters" would result in an unintended
federal land use program, (3) that expansion of the corps' permit
program under section 404 was discretionary rather than mandatory,
and (4) that regulation of dredge spoil and fill areas beyond tradi-
tional "navigable waters" was properly the authority of the EPA.57
The corps' argument focused on ambiguities in the act's volumi-
nous legislative history which were primarily caused by frequent misun-
derstandings and misuse of the term "navigable waters," and by Senator
Muskie's comment that a "mission-oriented agency" should leave envi-
ronmental considerations to the EPA.58 The corps also seized upon
the wording of section 404, which states that "the Secretary of the Army
may issue permits," to suggest that the section 404 permit program was
totally discretionary, and that its scope could be limited to the corps'
traditional jurisdiction if budget restraints and manpower demands ren-
dered implementation of a program infeasible. This argument ex-
pressed the understandable concern that the new jurisdictional burden
would be more than the corps could handle.5 9 Finally, the corps argued
that the EPA and the states should be responsible for dredge spoil and
fill regulation. This completely ignored the congressional intent of
section 404 to avoid the duplication of federal effort and expenditures
that would occur with the creation of a separate dredge and fill bureauc-
racy within the EPA.
The EPA argued in response that the legislative history established
clearly that Congress intended "waters of the United States" to be given
a more literal meaning. It cited the joint explanatory statement of the
holding that "navigable waters," as used in the act, has a broader meaning than that
connoted by the traditional corps jurisdiction. See United States v. Ashland Oil &
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
57. These arguments are set forth in a corps brief prepared for an appeal of the
Callaway decision. The appeal was never pursued by the Justice Department. This
brief was incorporated into the pleadings in Leslie v. Froehlke, Civil No. C-73-2294
WTS (N.D. Cal., Mar. 11, 1976).
58. See LEGISLATiVE H sToRY, supra note 47 at 1389. A careful reading of Sena-
tor Muskie's statements in their proper context indicates that, while the comments were
directed to the division of labor between the EPA and the corps under section 404, they
were made to defend the EPA's power to select or veto the specific sites for spoil dis-
posal. They did not suggest, as the corps argued, that the corps' role under the act was
confined to traditional "navigable waters."
59. The corps estimated that 1,750 additional personnel and an extra $53 million
annual appropriation would be necessary to administer the program. See letter from
Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army, to the Honorable Roy L. Ash, Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, January 20, 1975.
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committee of conference: "The conferees fully intend that the term
'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional interpre-
tation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made
or may be made for administrative purposes."6
Other portions of the legislative history also supported a broader
definition of "navigable waters." Congressman Dingell, an active sup-
porter of the act in the House, explained the conference committee's
expansion of the traditional jurisdiction:
[T]he conference bill defines the term "navigable waters"
broadly for water quality purposes. It means all the waters of the
United States in a geographic sense. It does not mean "navigable
waters of the United States" in the technical sense as we sometimes
see in some laws.
Thus, this new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies,
including main streams and their tributaries, for water quality pur-
poses. No longer are the old, narrow definitions of navigability,
as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters
covered by this bill.61
There was also fear in the Senate that "navigable waters" might be
defined narrowly, thereby stripping the act of its intended effect. This
fear was expressed in the report of the Senate Committee on Public
Works in its appeal for a broad definition of "navigable waters":
Through a narrow interpretation of the definition of interstate
waters the implementation [of the] 1965 Act was severely limited.
Water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge
of pollutants be controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to
the control requirements must be made to the navigable waters,
portions thereof, and their tributaries. 2
Although the Justice Department and the House Committee on
Government Operations joined the EPA's attack on the corps' narrow
definition, the corps was unwilling to make any alteration of its regula-
tions. As a result, the Natural Resources Defense Council brought suit
against the secretary of the army, the chief of engineers, and the EPA,
asking the court to force the corps to revoke and rescind the 1974
regulations and provide new ones in accord with the EPA's definition of
navigable waters. The plaintiffs cited the legislative history of the act
and recent judicial decisions holding that regulatory authority under the
act was not confined to the traditional concept of "navigable waters."
On March 27, 1975, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a partial
summary judgment in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calla-
way63 ordering the corps to propose new regulations "clearly recognizing
60. LEGISLATIVE HIsToRy, supra note 47, at 250-51.
61. Id. at 250.
62. Id. at 1495.
63. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act." 4 The corps wanted to
appeal the decision, and prepared a brief on its own behalf, but the
appeal was not pursued by the Justice Department. 5
Although a final appraisal of the impact of Callaway is not yet
possible, it appears that "waters of the United States" now invokes
powers coextensive with the commerce clause. The act defines away
traditional "navigable waters" as the measure of congressional regulato-
ry power, allowing federal regulation to embrace the broader jurisdic-
tion advocated by the EPA. As one authority put it:
Congress apparently intended to retain the connection to the
Commerce Clause, but eliminate "navigability" as the sole measure
of that connection. Under this interpretation, any connection of
the water to the Commerce power would suffice .... 66
By taking the corps beyond its traditional "navigable waters" juris-
diction, the Callaway decision in effect makes the corps the guardian of
the nation's wetlands. The legislative history of section 404 indicates
that Congress was primarily concerned with the disposal of polluted
dredge spoils; 67 no attention was directed to wetlands destruction caused
by real estate developments constructed on "fill" material. The courts,
however, have endorsed the literal wording of section 404,68 holding
that the corps must regulate all wetland development requiring the
placement of "fill". The boundaries of the corps' new wetlands au-
thority are propounded by the interim final regulations.
Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction Under Section 404: The New Regulations
In response to the Callaway decision, the corps published four
alternative regulations on May 6, 1975. 69 The new regulations actually
involved only two alternative definitions of "navigable waters" coupled
with two alternative methods of state participation in the permit
process. 70  Alternatives I and III contained the broader definition,
64. Id. at 686.
65. See Comprehensive Wetlands Protection: One Step Closer to Full Implementa-
tion of § 404 of the FWPCA, 5 ENviRON. L. REP. 10099, 10102 (July 1975) [herein-
after cited as Comprehensive Wetlands Protection].
66. R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control 17 (draft especially
prepared for ACI/ABA Seminar, 1973), cited in Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 DIcm L. Rnv. 459, 466 (1973).
67. See LEGISrATIVE HISTORY, supra note 47, at 421-24, 1386-93.
68. "The Secretary . .. may issue permits . .. for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters. . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV, 1974) (em-
phasis added).
69. 40 Fed. Reg. 19766-94 (1975).
70. Alternatives I and II, although requiring state permit approval prior to permit
approval by the corps, placed the decisionmaking burden of the permit process on the
corps and the EPA. Alternatives III and IV placed the decisionmaking burden primarily
on the states, with the corps routinely approving all state endorsed projects unless "over-
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extending section 404 jurisdiction in tidal areas shoreward to the
"aquatic vegetation line" or the "mean monthly high tide line," whichev-
er was further shoreward, and extending inland jurisdiction to all tribu-
taries of "navigable waters," and to all lakes, rivers, and streams in any
way touched by interstate commerce."' Alternatives II and IV entailed
a definition only slightly broader than the one set forth in the 1974
regulations, extending the corps' inland jurisdiction only to primary
(main stem) tributaries, and extending tidal jurisdiction only to mean
high water (mean higher high water on the West Coast)72 or the salt
water vegetation line, whichever extended further shoreward."3
Environmental groups and the EPA strongly preferred Alternative
I as the proper scope of corps jurisdictional authority. The corps
favored alternative IV and released a statement warning that the more
broadly defined jurisdictional schemes would require federal permits for
"the rancher who wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or
the mountaineer who wants to protect his land against stream ero-
sion."71 4  The corps' implication that the broader jurisdiction would
encompass millions of Americans such as farmers and swimming pool
owners was strongly protested by the EPA, and it requested the corps to
correct "the misunderstandings which your department's public state-
ments have created. 7
5
After the period for public comment, the corps issued its interim
final regulations on July 25, 1975. Rather than adopting one of the
four alternative proposals, the corps has worked out a hybrid regulatory
scheme that it hopes will be both administratively manageable and
responsive to environmental concerns. A major concern of the corps
was its ability to handle the extended jurisdiction under present budget-
ary and manpower restraints. The new regulations eased this problem
by phasing in the program over a two-year period. Phase I, which
became operative upon publication, included the traditional navigable
waters regulated by the corps, plus their "contiguous or adjacent wet-
lands." Phase I, which began on July 1, 1976, added to this the
regulation of all "primary tributaries . . . their contiguous or adjacent
wetlands, and all lakes."' 76  Finally, phase H, which begins on July 1,
riding national factors of the public interest" should dictate otherwise. Environmen-
talists preferred putting the decisionmaking onus on the federal agencies, while the corps
wanted the states to assume that burden. See Comprehensive Wetlands Protection, supra
note 65, at 10102.
71. 40 Fed. Reg. 31320-21 (1975).
72. See note 78 infra.
73. 40 Fed. Reg. 19767-68 (1975).
74. Comprehensive Wetlands Protection, supra note 65, at 10102.
75. Id.
76. 40 Fed. Reg. 31321 (1975). "Primary tributaries" are the main stems of trib-
utaries directly connected with navigable waters.
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1977, will encompass all discharges of dredged or fill material within
section 404 jurisdiction, including feeder streams and tributaries up to
their headwaters.
The response of environmentalists to the new interim final regula-
tions has been generally favorable, although there continues to be much
doubt and concern over what the scope of the new regulations will
actually be.77  The new regulations are complex and in many places
vague. Some of the uncertainties may be clarified when the final
regulations are released; other definitional problems will of necessity
only be smoothed out in their actual application. The remainder of this
note will highlight some of the more important aspects of the interim
final regulations, indicate potential problem areas, and suggest possible
improvements.
Tidal Jurisdiction
Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, the corps has traditionally
regulated all areas shoreward to "the mean high water mark"--7 --an
imaginary line on the shore established by the averaging of all higher
tides over a period of 18.6 years.79  Section 404 will significantly extend
this jurisdiction to include:
all coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and similar areas that are
contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters. "Coastal wet-
lands" includes marshes and shallows and means those areas peri-
odically inundated by saline or brackish waters and that are nor-
mally characterized by the prevalence of salt or brackish water veg-
etation capable of growth or reproduction. .... 80
The two determinants of "coastal wetlands"-periodic inundation
and salt or brackish water vegetation-provide an unfortunately vague
standard for the identification of jurisdictional boundaries. Periodic
inundation indicates the reach of the highest tides, but there is no
indicated period of time for such measurement. Does it include areas
inundated once a month, or even once a year? The second criterion,
salt water vegetation, suffers from a similar lack of precision. A typical
marsh ecosystem contains transition species of vegetation which may or
77. These doubts and concerns were expressed at the Corps of Engineers Public
Hearing on the Interim Final Regulations in San Bruno, Cal., Sept. 12, 1975 [herein-
after cited as Public Hearing].
78. On the Pacific Coast the mark is "mean higher high water." Tides on the
Pacific Coast are diurnal, meaning one high tide is markedly higher than the other high
tide (there are two high tides approximately every 24 hours). By contrast, Atlantic
Coast high tides are semi-diurnal, with little difference in the size of the two daily cy-
cles.
79. 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975). If no accurate tidal data exists, physical mark-
ings or comparison with similar geographical areas for which data exist may be used.
80. 40 Fed. Reg. 31324 (1975).
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may not necessarily receive periodic inundation, 81 rendering the estab-
lishment of a definite vegetation line both arbitrary and difficult.82
Environmental groups have suggested that the corps define coastal
wetlands as those areas either periodically inundated or characterized by
salt marsh vegetation.83  Although this definition is still handicapped by
the imprecision of the vegetative boundary, it has the advantage of
being, at least potentially, more inclusive of wetlands diked from regular
tidal action but still characterized by transition species of vegetation that
are a vital component of a healthy marsh ecosystem. By eliminating the
necessity of periodic inundation, salt water vegetation could conceivably
be defined more broadly to avoid an arbitrary division of the marsh
habitat.
Section 404 jurisdiction includes wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and
similar areas that are "contiguous or adjacent" to other coastal waters.8 4
Although undefined in its regulations, the corps used these terms to
designate different geographic areas. Contiguous areas are those wet-
lands having direct physical contact with coastal waters. Adjacent
wetlands or swamps are without this physical connection, but are in such
close proximity that they may be properly considered part of the same
water system. 8  Significantly, the interim regulations do not specify
whether adjacent areas will include wetlands diked from tidal action,
such as game refuges and salt ponds.
Diked wetlands periodically inundated are, of course, subject to
section 404 dredge and fill jurisdiction. Such wetlands are inundated
because of tide gates, pipe culverts, or breaches in existing dikes.8 6 The
interim regulations fall to address the possibility that such dikes might
be maintained in such a way as to end periodic tidal inundation,
presumably removing them from section 404 jurisdiction. Such mainte-
nance, of course, would require a corps permit if it involved the place-
ment of dredge or fill material such as the repair of breached dikes or
the blocking of pipe culverts. It is not presently clear that a permit
81. See letter from Michael Wilmar, Deputy Director of the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission, to Lt. General Gribble, Chief of Engi-
neers, June 5, 1975.
82. The corps has now prepared a list of species purportedly requiring periodic in-
undation. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975).
83. Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 57, 211. The Sierra Club, Audubon Society,
and California Trout took this position in their written comments on the new regula-
tions.
84. 40 Fed. Reg. 31324 (1975).
85. See Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 235, 238 (statement of General McIn-
tyre, Acting Director of Civil Works).
86. There are an estimated 25,000 acres of diked wetlands in the San Francisco
Bay area alone. See Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 33 (statement of Larry Moss,
California State Deputy Secretary of Forest Resources).
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will be required for the closure of a tide gate, however, and the corps
should provide in its regulations that wetlands cannot be removed from
section 404 jurisdiction by the maintenance of dikes in such a manner as
to end tidal inundation. Otherwise, the corps may find its wetland
jurisdiction continually shrinking as wetlands are dried out prior to
being used for dredge and fill projects.
Inland Jurisdiction
The most dramatic enlargement of corps authority is of its inland
jurisdiction. Prior to the promulgation of the interim regulations, the
corps was concerned only with the traditional "navigable waters" of the
country, meaning the more significant inland waterways. The new
regulations will by 1977 eventually extend corps control to the highest
mountain streams. Section 404 jurisdiction under these regulations
encompasses traditional "navigable waters" up to their headwaters and
landward to their ordinary high water mark,"' 7 and expands to include
(1) all artificially created channels used for recreational or other
navigational purposes and connected to navigable waters, (2) all tribu-
taries of navigable waters up to their headwaters, (3) interstate waters
up to their headwaters, and (4) all intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams
up to their headwaters if they are in any way used or involved in
interstate commerce, and thus subject to the commerce clause.88
The jurisdictional margins of inland streams, lakes, and rivers are
to be determined by the "ordinary high water mark"--the point on the
shore found to be inundated 25 percent of the time according to
available data.s9 If no such data exists, the mark will be determined by
such obvious physical characteristics as erosion, shelving, soil character,
or the absence of terrestrial vegetation. 90 Excluded from inland juris-
diction are irrigation ditches and lakes less than five acres in surface
area.
91
Inland jurisdiction extends in all cases to the "headwaters" of the
river, lake, or stream. '"Headwaters" is defined as "the point on the
stream above which the flow is normally less than 5 cubic feet per
second ... ,"92 The word "normally" leaves the definition deliberately
87. 40 Fed. Reg. 31324 (1975).
88. Id. Interstate commerce would include use of the waters for recreation by in-
terstate travelers or the removal of fish sold in interstate commerce.
89. Id. at 31325.
90. Id.
91. Id. Such a lake, if perfectly round, would have a diameter of approximately
80 yards.
92. Id. (emphasis added). Streams less than five cubic feet per second have been
described by corps officials as "small enough that you can step across them without get-
ting your pant cuffs wet."
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vague, providing the corps maximum discretion for the purpose of
determining the limits of its jurisdiction.9" The effect of this regulation
is to extend corps dredge and fill jurisdiction to all tributaries up to the
point where significant flow ceases.
Freshwater marshes, swamps, and similar areas contiguous or adja-
cent to other waters also come under the new regulations. Such areas,
termed "freshwater wetlands," are those areas "periodically inundated
and .. .normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that
requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction. ... 91
Discretionary Jurisdiction
The new regulations give the district engineer discretionary author-
ity to regulate other areas for the protection of water quality not
specified in the regulations, suggesting that intermittent rivers or streams
and "perched" wetlands95 are among the candidates for such special
treatment. This is a wise inclusion, as it enables the corps to respond
flexibly to dredge and fill proposals in sensitive areas otherwise outside
section 404 jurisdiction. Discretionary jurisdiction could conceivably
be exercised over the gray margins of section 404 authority, covering
such areas as salt ponds and wetlands diked from periodic tidal inunda-
tion. The corps will understandably be reluctant to use this provision
often, however, for fear of political repercussions.
Exempted Activities
Prior to the promulgation of the new regulations, the corps gener-
ated publicity indicating that the section 404 permit program might
apply to such typical farming practices as drainage or irrigation ditch
construction, stock ponds, plowing, land leveling, and check dams. 96
This representation was strongly criticized by environmental groups and
the EPA, who viewed it as an attempt to jar Congress into contracting
the corps' new jurisdiction. Fortunately, the interim final regulations
exempt from the permit process all activities involving "normal" farm-
ing, ranching, or silviculture practices.17  What practices are normal is
not altogether clear, although permits will be required for the damming
of major streams, diking, and discharging dredged or fill material in
wetlands.98
93. See Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 168 (statement of General Kenneth Mc-
Intyre).
94. 40 Fed. Reg. 31324-25 (1975).
95. "Perched" wetlands are usually fairly remote from the water body in question,
typically at a higher elevation. Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 288-89 (statement of
General Kenneth McIntyre).
96. See Comprehensive Wetlands Protection, supra note 65, at 10102.
97. 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
98. This information is found in a corps handout, Section 404, distributed at the
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A potentially important issue is whether the construction of logging
roads, involving fill placement in numerous streams, will be exempt as a
normal silviculture practice. Timber interests are concerned that the
new regulations will mean another layer of bureaucratic delay and
expense for timber harvesting operations.99 Conventional timber har-
vesting normally requires the construction of an extensive logging road
network,100 and these roads invariably cross numerous streams and
tributaries soon to be regulated under section 404. The construction of
stream crossings usually involves the placement of pipe culverts and
other fill material in these streams. If permits were required for the
placement of this fill, the administrative burden would be overwhelm-
ing,' 0 ' and the potential delay in the construction of logging roads.
would have unacceptable economic impacts on the timber industry.
The corps can avoid this administrative quagmire by regarding
logging road construction as a "normal" silviculture activity necessary
for the harvesting of forest products. This would abdicate any regula-
tion whatever over stream crossing construction fill. Alternatively, the
corps could issue general permits for stream crossing construction. Such
general permits may be issued for certain clearly described categories of
activity subject to the corps permit process. Once issued, a general
permit authorizes clearly described categories of work; individual activi-
ties within such categories need no further authorization. The categor-
ies of activities encompassed by the general permit concept include only
"activities that are substantially similar in nature, that cause only mini-
mal adverse environmental impact when performed separately, and that
will have only a minimal adverse cumulative effect on the environment
.... ,"02 The general permit is well adapted to logging road stream
crossing activities, and can generally be used in many other situations to
ease the corps' new administrative responsibility and to avoid unneces-
sary bureaucratic morass. The corps could require logging companies
to apply for a permit for all stream crossings built within a designated
logging region. This general permit could prescribe and standardize
San Bruno Public Hearing to inform the audience about corps jurisdiction under the in-
terim final regulations.
99. These fears were aired by timber representatives from throughout the Pacific
Northwest at the hearing. See Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 39, 44-50, 71-76, 97-
104.
100. In the Pacific Northwest the EPA estimates that 9,300 miles of logging roads
are built or rebuilt each year. See Public Hearing, supra note 77, at 101 (statement
of Harold Hartman, specialist for the Industrial Forestry Association).
101. See id. Mr. Hartman's estimate put the number of required section 404 stream
crossing permits in the Pacific Northwest at 46,500 per year. Even if this estimate is
exaggerated, the required number of permits would be astronomically greater than the
700 section 404 permits processed in that region in 1974.
102. 40 Fed. Reg. 31335 (1975).
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the procedures for all stream crossing activities to insure that any
environmental impact will be minimal. Such an approach would pre-
sumably make the regulation of stream crossing construction both ac-
ceptable to the timber industry and administratively manageable, while
allowing the corps to protect sensitive watershed areas from environ-
mentally objectionable fill projects.
Environmental Input and the Permit Process
Every permit processed by the corps requires an assessment of the
environmental impact of the proposed project. This environmental
input into the permit process is mandated by the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)1°0 and the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act.10 4  NEPA declares it to be the policy of the federal govern-
ment to promote a harmonious relationship between man and his
environment, and declares that "to the fullest extent possible . . . the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in
this chapter .. . ."I" In furtherance of this mandate, all agencies of
the federal government are directed to develop procedures "which will
insure that presently unquantifiable environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with
economic and technical considerations . ".1..6
In response to NEPA, the corps expanded the criteria by which it
judged permit applications for construction or work in traditional navi-
gable waters by developing a public interest review of all permit appli-
cations. The corps' 1975 regulations will subject all section 404 permit
applications to this review, requiring that the corps evaluate the impact
on the public interest of any proposed dredge and fill project. The corps
is then to balance the benefits of the project against its foreseeable detri-
ments before deciding whether a permit will issue. 10 7 In reaching its de-
cision, the corps must consider (1) the public and private need for the
project, (2) possible alternative locations and methods, (3) the extent
and permanence of beneficial or detrimental effects, and (4) the cumu-
lative effect created by other projects in the vicinity. 0 8
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66(c) (1970).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
106. Id. § 4332(2)(B).
107. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31327 (1975).
108. Id. "Cumulative effect" is an important consideration for dredge and fill ap-
plications. Viewed in isolation such projects are often environmentally innocuous, while
their cumulative effect is unquestionably pernicious. See Hoyer, Corps of Engineers
Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing a Citadel Under Seige, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
19, 20 (1973).
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The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requires the corps to
consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and with the
head of the appropriate state agency concerned with wildlife resources
before issuing a permit for dredge or fill. To facilitate the act, a
memorandum of understanding between the secretary of the interior and
the secretary of the army pledges the two agencies to a policy of mutual
cooperation and obligates the corps to consider all aesthetic, environ-
mental, and public interest factors before issuing permits. The effect of
this agreement is to assure that state and federal fish and wildlife
agencies have a strong voice in the permit process; an applicant's failure
to meet their objections requires secretarial level approval, a process
involving considerable delay.
Under the interim final regulations, no permit shall be issued where
state or local authorization has been denied. The corps is in effect
deferring to the timely denial of a permit application by an authorized
state agency. If the state agency does issue a permit, the corps will also
issue a permit in the "absence of contrary overriding national factors
of the public interest." 109 By deferring to authorized state agencies the
corps effectively shares its administrative duties with the state. In cases
where several state agencies have conflicting positions on a permit
application, and no state agency has been singled out to coordinate the
state position, the corps will elicit the views of the governor to resolve
the state's position on the application. 110
The interim final regulations also allow the district engineer to
arrange a joint permit process with state agencies having similar regula-
tory duties, including joint public notices, joint public hearings, and
joint analysis of public input into the permit process."' The develop-
ment of joint permit processing is crucial when one considers that even
the most innocuous and minor projects often require multiple authoriza-
tions from state, regional, and federal agencies." 2  This laudable move
toward joint processing is necessary to encourage public acceptance,
avoid duplicative efforts, and prevent regulatory discredit caused by
expensive and unnecessary delay.
When the corps issues a permit it can mitigate environmental
damage by making it subject to conditions. The applicant is then
compelled to fulfill the mitigating conditions or risk the nullification of
his permit. This provision gives the corps an excellent tool to curb the
severity of environmental damage caused by dredging or filling opera-
109. 40 Fed. Reg. 31327 (1975).
110. Id.
111. Id. In California the corps has begun to hold joint public hearings with some
state regulatory agencies.
112. The placement of a short boatramp in the San Francisco Bay often requires
as many as five different permits.
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tions. The corps could, for example, authorize a fill project conditioned
upon the applicant's restoration to tidal marshland of an equivalent
area of land presently behind dikes. Such conditions, of course, can
only be fashioned on a case-by-case basis, in view of the particular
circumstances of each applicant.
Retroactive Permits
Under earlier regulations, a developer wishing to perform question-
able work was often better off not applying for a permit if there was a
reasonable chance that the work would not be discovered by the corps.
If he was discovered after the work had progressed, he was merely
compelled to apply for a retroactive (or "after the fact") permit." 3 Only
if this permit were denied did he face legal sanctions. This policy
subverted the efficacy of the permit process, providing strong incentive
to ignore it altogether for such projects as minor dredge and fill opera-
tions. Another problem with the regulations was that they obligated the
corps to process to a conclusion all retroactive permit applications before
injunctive legal remedies to stop unauthorized work could be taken." 4
This made difficult the use of injunctive remedies under the Rivers and
Harbors Act, and handicapped the corps' ability to take immediate
action against environmentally unsound projects." 5
The new interim final regulations seek to end this abuse of the
retroactive permit, but do not eliminate it altogether. Under the new
regulations, the district engineer has the power to issue cease and desist
orders when he becomes aware of unauthorized activities within areas
under the corps' jurisdiction." 6 He is then responsible for investigating
the activities and should solicit the views of the various state, local, and
federal agencies which might have information about them. If the ac-
tivity is in nontidal waters not previously found to be within the tradi-
tional navigable waters regulated by the corps, the district engineer
should "instruct the responsible persons to immediately file for a per-
mit.""117 If, on the other hand, the activity is within the traditional navi-
gable waters, or if the district engineer feels immediate legal action is
113. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c)(1)(IV) (1972).
114. Id. This problem arose in a case in which the federal appeals court vacated
the district court's mandatory injunction after the corps failed to process a retroactive
permit application. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla.
1971), vacated in part, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
115. See Kramon, Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a
New Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REv. 229, 262 (1973).
116. 40 Fed. Reg. 31330 (1975).
117. Id. A retroactive permit is presumably still possible because there is a strong
possibility that the applicant acted in good faith, without knowledge of the corps' ex-
panded jurisdiction. If bad faith is apparent, however, the corps can apparently seek
an injunction without processing a retroactive permit application.
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otherwise warranted by the circumstances, the corps cannot accept or
process any permit application for the unauthorized activity.118 Instead
the matter is referred directly to the United States attorney for the appro-
priate legal action. Any "after the fact application" will be accepted in
such cases only after the judicial proceedings are resolved and all fines,
penalties, or court-ordered restoration work are paid or performed." 9
The new regulations represent an attempt to restrict retroactive
permits to applicants who performed work in good faith due to the
sudden change in the corps' jurisdiction. Although this procedure has
some rationale until the corps' jurisdiction is more precisely delineated
and more broadly understood, the retroactive permit should be abol-
ished. Even in its present limited form it could potentially undermine
the regulatory certainty of section 404, just as the earlier retroactive
permit procedure hindered enforcement under the Rivers and Harbors
Act.
Disclaimers
The final paragraph of the interim regulations concerned with
activities undertaken without a required permit is ambiguously phrased
as follows:
Applications will generally not be required for work or structures
completed before 18 December 1968, nor where potential appli-
cants had received expressions of disclaimer prior to the date of
this regulation; provided, however, that the procedures of para-
graph (g)(12)(i) of this section shall apply to all work or struc-
tures which were commenced or completed on or after 18 Decem-
ber 1968, and may be applied to all specific cases, regardless of
date of construction or previous disclaimers, for which the District
Engineer determines that the interests of navigation so require.' 20
The vague and confusing nature of this paragraph is apparent. It
"generally" exempts from the permit process (1) work completed be-
fore December 18, 1968, and (2) work carried out in accordance with
an "expression of disclaimer.' 121 - The term "expression of disclaimer"
is overly broad. No distinction is made between a formal waiver from
the district engineer and a careless telephone remark of a lower echelon
regulatory bureaucrat. At the very least, the regulations should require
the disclaimer to be in writing and to state precisely which area and
activity are exempt from the permit process.
The second half of the paragraph provides that even "disclaimed"
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 31330-31.
121. A disclaimer involves the informing of a potential applicant that no permit
will be needed for a proposed activity. Such disclaimers are usually based on the corps'
lack of geographical jurisdiction. As the corps' jurisdictional margins have changed rad-
ically, many of the disclaimers issued in recent years would not be issued today.
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work is subject to the corps' power to issue such cease and desist orders
if the activity could affect navigation "regardless of the date of construc-
tion or previous disclaimers. 12 2 Disclaimers for activities not affecting
navigation are presumably valid if given prior to the promulgation of the
new regulations,' 23 despite the fact that many of these disclaimers were
based upon the misconceived pre-Callaway jurisdictional scheme.
The regulation regarding disclaimers is unnecessary and unwise,
and it is highly questionable whether the corps can be bound by any
disclaimer based on an erroneous view of its jurisdiction. Even where
there is reliance on such disclaimers, the prevailing view is that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel does not generally apply to a governmen-
tal unit functioning in a governmental capacity. 24  The court relied on
this tenet in United States v. Lewis 25, where it held that an ill-founded
disclaimer from the corps did not estop the government from ordering
the removal of illegal fill placed in tidal marshlands.
It is also accepted that an administrative agency may reverse a
practice, however long standing, if it decides that the practice is based on
an incorrect interpretation of the law, and that it is not estopped to deny
the validity of a prior transaction or agreement the law does not sanc-
tion.126  Thus it seems that the corps can legally ignore past disclaimers
based on outmoded jurisdictional frameworks, regardless of when the
disclaimer was issued or whether the activity affects navigation. The
present corps policy needlessly forfeits its regulatory powers under
section 404. The corps should therefore either narrow or discard its
disclaimer regulation.
Conclusion
Our nation's tidal wetlands are an invaluable natural resource of
122. These are the powers of the corps under 40 Fed. Reg. 31330 (1975).
123. Id. at 31331.
124. See 28 AM. JuR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver, § 133 (1966); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1916); United States v. Florida, 482 F.2d 205
(5th Cir. 1973); Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 937 (1966).
125. 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (S.D. Ga. 1973); accord, Bornstein v. United States,
345 F.2d 558, 562-63 (Ct. Cl. 1965). See also United States v. City & County of San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 32 (1940). But see United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514
F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975); Leslie Salt Co. v. FroehIke, Civil No. C-73-2294 WTS (N.D.
Cal., March 11, 1976); United States v. Freethy, Civil No. C-73-1470 SC (N.D. Cal.,
Feb. 24, 1975). These three cases held, in effect, that equitable considerations required
a partial estoppel against the government.
126. See United States v. Florida, 482 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1973); Maxwell Co.
v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969); Shawmut Ass'n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791 (1st
Cir. 1945); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51, 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 795 (1944); Pacific Shrimp Co. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 375 F. Supp.
1036, 1042 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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unique ecological significance. They comprise a highly productive habi-
tat for diverse plant and animal life, function as the purifying "lungs" of
estuarine systems, provide a natural means of flood control, and are the
nesting and wintering sites for waterfowl. Unfortunately, the delicately
balanced marsh ecosystem is extremely vulnerable to the enterprises of
modern man. Dredge and fill activities, primarily for navigation, com-
mercial developments, and housing developments, have done disastrous
and irrevocable damage to the tidal marsh resource.
127
The new corps regulations recognize the importance of wetlands,
both for water quality and ecological purposes. They expand the corps'
jurisdiction under section 404 of the FWPCA of 1972, and this broader
jurisdiction should enable the corps to defend this delicate resource
more effectively.
To be effective in its enlarged role of environmental guardian, the
corps has realistically delegated its authority through a policy of partial
deference to responsible state agencies. 'New efforts to end bureaucratic
delay are essential to avoid discrediting the regulatory process, and the
corps' move toward joint permit processing with responsible state agen-
cies is laudable.
The new regulations are, however, unavoidably replete with vague
terms, leaving the precise contours of the new jurisdiction to be ham-
mered out by future conflict. The new rules contain important prob-
lems, notably the overly narrow definition of "coastal wetlands" and the
overly broad disclaimer clause. But these objections aside, the interim
final regulations are an encouraging advance for wetlands protection,
and properly reflect the corps' intended function under the FWPCA
amendments of 1972.
Dick Ratliff*
127. The nation has already lost 40% of its tidal wetlands, mostly to dredge and
fill projects. See Comprehensive Wetlands Protection, supra note 65, at 10099.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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